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SECTION 1981: EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO
CONTRACT DOCTRINE TO PROHIBIT
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ADMISSIONS
POLICIES IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
The American educational system traditionally has been composed
of both public and private institutions.' Since Brown v. Board of
Education,2 it has been clear that racial segregation in public education
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
constitutional doctrine announced in Brown, however, did not apply to
private schools 3 which operated without any form of state involve-
ment.4 Thus, the racially discriminatory admissions policies of many
private schools remained unchecked until the United States Supreme
Court, in Runyon v. McCrary,5 held that the denial of admission to a
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the alternative of sending children to public or
private schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), which held that
private school attendance constituted compliance with compulsory education laws. See
generally D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 1-31 (1974).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated public educational facilities are inherently
unequal and violate the fourteenth amendment).
3. Immediately after the Court's decision in Brown, private white schools began to
increase in number and size. Their growth skyrocketed, however, after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d (1970) and the subsequent
Supreme Court decisions which compelled school authorities to take affirmative action
to eliminate segregation. See, e.g., Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968). Enrollment in those southern private schools organized in response to desegrega-
tion increased from about 25,000 in 1966 to approximately 535,000 in 1972. See Note,
Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441 (1973).
4. The fourteenth amendment does not apply to "private" entities unless some form
of state action is found. The courts, however, have found state action in a variety of
private school activities including state funding, Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F.
Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n., 275 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); use of public facilities, Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 417 U.S. 556 (1974);
textbook loans, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); state control, Coleman v.
Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Howard University v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 926 (D.D. C. 1973), afftd, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973); tax
exemption, Green v. Connelly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D. D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Allen v. County School Bd., 198 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va.
1961). But see Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (the court held that
the chartering of the university, providing financial aid in the form of public funds, and
the granting of tax exemptions were not sufficient state involvement to transform a
private university into a state university).
5. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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private school solely on the basis of race violated the right to contract
guarantee of 42 U.S.C. section 1981.6
In McCrary, parents of a five year old black child submitted an
admissions application to a private school in Fairfax County, Virginia,
to enroll their son in the school's summer day camp program.7 The
school returned the form, explaining that it was "unable to accomo-
date the application.''8 Upon further inquiry, the school's chairman
informed the parents that the school was not integrated. The parents
then contacted another private school in Arlington, Virginia, but did
not submit an application after being told that only Caucasians were
accepted. 9 Thereafter, the parents brought an action for damages
based upon the deprivation of their child's civil rights, and to enjoin
the schools' ° from discriminating against qualified blacks in their en-
rollment practices. The Supreme Court, affirming an award of equit-
able and compensatory relief," held that 42 U.S.C. section 1981, which
grants all persons equal rights to make and enforce contracts, prohi-
bited private schools from excluding qualified children solely because
of their race.
The post Civil War Congress enacted the original section 1981,
which included a right to contract guarantee, as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 186612 to enforce the thirteenth amendment.' 3 Doubts concern-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "All persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .
7. 427 U.S. at 165.
8. Id.
9. Another plaintiff also called this school about enrolling her two-year old son in its
nursery school. She asked whether the school was integrated, was told that it was not,
and therefore, did not file a formal application. Id.
10. The Southern Independent School Association (SISA), an association of six state
organizations which represent over 300 private, nonprofit schools, intervened as a party
defendant. It was stipulated that many of these schools deny admission to blacks. Id. at
164.
11. The court of appeals upheld the district court's award of conpensatory relief to
plaintiffs and the district court's denial of damages barred by the Virginia statute of
limitations, but reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff. 515
F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'g in part, Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363
F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
12. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Prior to the Civil War, black persons were considered
chattel. Because their status was that of a slave, they could neither own property nor
enter into contracts. See Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at
Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REv. 272, 275, (1969). After the war,
Congress passed the thirteenth amendment, which technically abolished slavery and
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ing the constitutional validity of the 1866 Act led to the passage of the
fourteenth amendment. 4 After the fourteenth amendment's ratifica-
tion, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1870,15 which reenacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This chain of events created disagreement
among the courts about whether the 1870 reenactment was intended to
incorporate a state action requirement into the Act. 6 This dispute,
coupled with the Supreme Court's decision in 1906 to restrict the
application of the thirteenth amendment to situations of actual enslave-
ment, 17 severly limited the statute's usefulness as a means to combat
private acts of racial discrimination.18
involuntary servitude throughout the nation. See generally Hamilton, The Legislative and
Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L BAR J. 26, 27 (1951); tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States-Consummation to Aboli-
tion and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALF. L. REv. 171 (1951); Note, The
'New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969).
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1329 (1952); tenBroek, supra note 13, at 200.
15. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870).
16. The reenactment resulted in two different interpretations of the 1866 Act. The
provisions of the reenactment modified the language of § 1981 by extending its protec-
tions to all persons within the United States, rather than to citizens alone. It was thought
that the change of language in § 1981 indicated that the statute was intended to enforce
the fourteenth amendment rather than the thirteenth. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24, 30-31 n.7 (1948); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-98 (1898). In
addition, because the Civil Rights Act of 1870 followed the ratification of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments, each of which contained state action requirements, some
courts held that a state action requirement was incorporated into the 1866 Act. See, e.g.,
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Neal v. Deleware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953); Waters v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., 227 F.
Supp. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Spampinato v. M. Breger & Co., 166 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. N.Y.
1958), affl'd, 270 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944 (1960); Chicago's Last
Department Store v. Indiana Alchoholic Beverage Comm'n., 161 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ind.
1958). Other courts, however, maintained that the history of the 1870 Act demonstrated
that Congress did not intend to alter the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and that the 1866 Act
applied to acts of private discrimination. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark.
1903); In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); United States v.
Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). This position was reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The Supreme Court expressly
overruled Hodges in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968).
18. After the Supreme Court's decision in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906), litigants had to rely on the fourteenth amendment to contest racial discrimination.
Unlike the thirteenth amendment, the fourteenth amendment was only applicable where
there was some form of state action. To compensate for the lack of a judicial remedy
against private discrimination, the courts attempted to expand the reach of the state
action doctrine. See generally Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes fora Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In 1968, however, the Supreme Court revived the thirteenth amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as judicial tools to prohibit
private discriminatory activity. The Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,1 9 reexamined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and held that section 198220 prohibited a privately operated real estate
company from refusing to sell a home to the plaintiff solely because he
was black. The Jones Court, in dicta, inferred that section 1981 would
prohibit private discriminatory acts in contracting. 21
Following the Jones decision, the courts liberally applied the 1866
Civil Rights Act to various forms of private discrimination. The Sup-
reme Court construed section 1982 to prohibit discriminatory exclusion
from a community park22 and a private club.23 Lower courts inter-
Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARx L. Rav. 59, 94 (1967); Williams, The Twilight of StateAction,
41 TEx. L. REV. 347 (1963).
19. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property."
21. While not commenting directly on § 1981, the Jones Court inferred that §§
1981-1982, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, should be given parallel
interpretations.
In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt [the Civil Rights Act of 1866] and
the contents of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the Act was
designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination,
whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein
392 U.S. at 436. In addition, the Jones Court analyzed the legislative history of the 1866
Act and held that its reenactment in the Civil Rights Act of 1870 did not incorporate a
state action requirement into the earlier act.
But it certainly does not follow that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the subsequent readoption of the Civil Rights Act were meant somehow to limit its
application to state action. The legislative history furnishes not the slightest factual
basis for any such speculation, and the conditions prevailing in 1870 make it highly
implausible.
Id. (emphasis in original). Even after the Jones decision, however, a few courts still
required a showing of state action to invoke § 1981. See, e.g., Cook v. The Advertiser
Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1972) (§ 1981 applies only to state action and is not violated by refusal of newspaper to
publish Negro bridal announcement in society section of newspaper); Tennessee v.
Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (actions committed by hospital and
physician in their private capacities were not "under color of state law" as required by §
1981); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) (section 1981 does not provide jurisdiction in
fair employment practices action). Recently courts have accepted the interpretation of §
1981 set forth by the Jones Court. In WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F.
Supp. 577, 580 (M.D. Ala. 1973), the court stated that "it has now become clear that this
circuit has adopted the theory that state action is not a requisite element of a section 1981
claim by a black plaintiff." See also notes 24-29 infra.
22. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (defendant corpora-
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preted section 1981 to bar private acts of racial discrimination24 related
to contracting in employment cases,25 business contracts and ser-
vices,26 hospital admissions policies, 27 the use of recreational
facilities,2 and admissions to state licensed training schools. 29 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court, prior to McCrary, stated that "§ 1981 affords
a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the
tion's refusal to approve a membership share assignment to a black person which would
have permitted access to a private park and playground violated the right to lease
guarantee of § 1982).
23. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (swimming
pool association's racially discriminatory membership policy violated the right
to purchase, lease and hold property under § 1982).
24. Courts have also interpreted § 1981 to protect resident and registered aliens
against private discriminatory acts related to contracting. See Roberto v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Guerra
v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972), modified, 498
F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974). Non-minorities can also obtain relief under § 1981.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976) (§ 1981 was violated
where two white employees were discharged for misappropriating cargo, but a
black employee charged with the same offense was not discharged; statute protects
whites as well as nonwhites).
25. E.g., Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1972) (unfavored
treatment); Brady v. Bristol-Meyer, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972) (discriminatory
practices); Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757
(3d Cir. 1971) (transfer); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437
F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971) (job placement); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (false charges); Tramble v.
Converters Ink Co., 343 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (discharge); Page v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1060 (D. N.J. 1971) (promotion); Tolbert v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 332 F. Supp. 772 (D. S.C. 1971) (refusal to hire); Central Contractors
Ass'n. v. Local 46, IBEW, 312 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (work stoppage);
Clark v. American Machine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969) (job classification);
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (union
membership and referral status). But cf. Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dept.,
395 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. La. 1974) (claim of racial discrimination in hiring barred
by sovereign immunity); Keys v. Continental Ill. Nat'l. Bank and Trust Co., 357 F.
Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (dismissal from job based on failure to comply with dress
code not race).
26. Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (rental of
apartments); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1972) (issuance of insurance contracts); Black v. Bonds, 308 F. Supp. 774
(S.D. Ala. 1969) (service in a restaurant).
27. United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D. S.C. 1969) (equal
admissions to and employment opportunities in private hospital).
28. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970)
(admission to private amusement park).
29. Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D. N.C. 1971) (admission to
state licensed barber training school).
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basis of race." 30
Thus, in view of the case law, the Supreme Court in McCrary, was
faced with a clear choice-either to restrict the scope of section 1981
and reaffirm the pre-Jones decisions, 3' or to continue the trend begun
by Jones and construe section 1981 to bar private acts of discrimina-
tion in contracting. 32 Following the Jones interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the McCrary Court affirmed the broad applicabili-
ty and constitutionality of section 1981. 33 The Court asserted that
section 1981 does in fact prohibit racial discrimination in the making
and enforcement of private contracts. 34 Applying the statute to private
school admissions, the Court upheld the determination that the rela-
tionship between the school and the parent and child was contractual,35
and concluded that the defendants' actions were a "classic violation"
36
of section 1981. The McCrary Court further held that prohibiting
private racial discrimination under the facts presented did not infringe
the defendants' freedom of association, 37 parental rights38 or right of
30. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (comparing §
1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
31. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
32. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
33. 427 U.S. at 168-75.
34. Id. at 168. In dissent, Justice White argued that § 1981 did no more than
remove legal disabilities in contracting (i.e., state laws prohibiting contracting with
Negroes).
The statute [§ 1981] by its terms does not require any private individual or
institution to enter into a contract or perform any other act under any
circumstances; and it consequently fails to supply a cause of action by
respondent students against petitioner schools based on the latter's racially
motivated decision not to contract with them.
Id. at 194-95 (White, J., dissenting).
35. The Court reasoned that a contractual relationship exists between private
schools and parents who enroll their children in them, because the schools receive
payments for services rendered and the student receives instruction in return for
those payments. Id. at 172. See, e.g., Asheville School v. Kirk, 269 Ill. App. 365
(1933); McClintock v. Lake Forest Univ., 222 Ill. App. 468 (1921); Booker v. Grand
Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909). See generally Note, The
Student-School Legal Relationship: Toward a Unitary Theory, 5 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 468,
475-76 (1971).
36. 427 U.S. at 172.
37. The right of association embraces "the freedom to engage in associations for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1957). The McCrary Court asserted that termination of the school's discriminatory
admissions practice would not inhibit the teaching of any ideas or dogmas, and thus
found no infringement of the right of association. 427 U.S. at 176. Furthermore,
the Court noted that "[i]ndividious private discrimination . . . has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections." Id. quoting Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
38. It is well settled that parents have the right to direct the upbringing and
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privacy.39
McCrary is not a panacea. The decision will not achieve full-scale
integration of private schools. Section 1981 can be used to prohibit
racially discriminatory admissions policies of private schools where
the prospective student is denied admissions solely because he is
black. Academic, financial, religious and sex-based restrictions on
admissions were not within the scope of the McCrary holding4 . Where
the school's acts of racial discrimination are neither blatant nor ex-
plicit, the plaintiff's burden of proof may be prohibitive. 4 Moreover,
private schools may attempt to circumvent McCrary by practicing
covert racial discrimination and using pledges, donations, and scholar-
ships to evade the contract requirement necessary to invoke section
1981. Despite its limited scope, however, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McCrary is significant. Discriminatory practices within private
education were considered outside the scope of judicial scrutiny until
McCrary. 2 Although the McCrary decision focused on the freedom to
education of their children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The
McCrary decision does not affect a private school's right to operate or teach a
particular subject, nor does it affect the parents' right to send their children to
private schools. The McCrary Court held that no parental right had been infringed
upon because the parents were free to send their children to private schools and the
schools were "presumptively free to inculcate whatever values and standards they
deemled] desirable." 427 U.S. at 177.
39. The Court held that although the application of § 1981 to a racially discriminatory
school admissions policy implicates parental interests, parents "have no
constitutional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered by
reasonable government regulation." 427 U.S. at 178.
40. 427 U.S. at 167.
41. See Gonzales v. Southern Methodist Univ., 536 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1976)
(injunction denied because the record revealed no evidence of discrimination based
on race); Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D.
Fla. 1973) (court denied relief after finding other factors present, aside from race,
to deny plaintiff's admission).
42. See, e.g., Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W.
589 (1909) (constitution did not restrain the refusal to admit blacks students to a
medical school incorporated under state law); Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278
Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923) (a private school has discretion to exclude or dismiss
undesirable students).
After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the courts applied the
fourteenth amendment to prohibit discrimination in private schools where some
form of state action was present. See note 4 supra. But where state action was not
found, the fourteenth amendment did not apply to private schools. See, e.g., Bright
v. Isenberger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1971) (due process requirements do not apply to expulsion proceedings in a private
school); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962) (racially exclusionary admissions); Reed v. Hollywood Professional School,
169 Cal. App. 2d 887, 338 P.2d 633 (1959) (racially exclusionary admissions).
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contract rather than the overall desegregation of private education, it
nonetheless provides a new weapon with which aggrieved persons can
challenge racial discrimination in private education. 43 By affirming the
Jones Court's historical interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
McCrary ensures that the thirteenth amendment will remain a viable
constitutional restraint on private discrimination.
Susan D. Grob
43. The McCrary Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's reversal of an award of
attorney's fees to plaintiffs holding that § 1981 did not specifically authorize a fee
award and that there was no other statutory basis for the fees. 427 U.S. at 182-86.
See Ayeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), noted in
1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 1071 (rejecting "private attorneys general" theory of fee
awards unless statutorily authorized). The inability to recover attorney's fees under
§ 1981 might have inhibited other aggreived persons from bringing suits against
private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies. Congress, however,
has eliminated this potential barrier. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, authorizes an award of attorneys fee to a
prevailing party in actions brought to enforce § 1981 as well as other enumerated
civil rights statutes. See generally Larson, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of
1976, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 778 (1977).
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